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Abstract In recent technology nodes, reliability is increasingly considered a part of the standard design flow
to be taken into account at all levels of embedded systems design. While traditional fault simulation techniques
based on low-level models at gate- and register transfer-level oﬀer high accuracy, they are too ineﬃcient to prop-
erly cope with the complexity of modern embedded systems. Moreover, they do not allow for early exploration
of design alternatives when a detailed model of the whole system is not yet available, which is highly required to
increase the eﬃciency and quality of the design flow. Multi-level models that combine the simulation eﬃciency
of high abstraction models with the accuracy of low-level models are therefore essential to eﬃciently evaluate
the impact of physical defects on the system.
This paper proposes a methodology to eﬃciently implement concurrent multi-level fault simulation across gate-
and transaction-level models in an integrated simulation environment. It leverages state-of-the-art techniques
for eﬃcient fault simulation of structural faults together with transaction-level modeling. This combination of
diﬀerent models allows to accurately evaluate the impact of faults on the entire hardware/software system while
keeping the computational eﬀort low. Moreover, since only selected portions of the system require low-level
models, early exploration of diﬀerent design alternatives is eﬃciently supported.
Experimental results obtained from three case studies are presented to demonstrate the high accuracy of the
proposed method when compared with a standard gate/RT mixed-level approach and the strong improvement
of simulation time which is reduced by four orders of magnitude in average.
Keywords Fault simulation, multi-level, transaction-level modeling
1 Introduction
Structural faults model the consequences of physical defects at the gate- and logic-level. The variability
and defect mechanisms in nano-scale CMOS are complex [1] and require that structural faults of VLSI
circuits are considered also during functional operation [2]. The impact of faults also depends on the
application scenarios [3, 4], which occupy and utilize the hardware diﬀerently.
Only a subset of the errors observed at logic-level lead to failures at system-level [5], but those that
do must be accurately analyzed. The analysis of this interaction at early design stages gives important
feedback for reliable [6, 7] and secure systems [8]. Usually, it is not feasible to run gate-level simulation
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1of a complex design either for its size or model availability. Instead, multi-level simulation techniques are
used.These techniques use models at diﬀerent abstraction levels: models with high accuracy for the fault
injection and highly abstract models for the evaluation of the consequences [5]. Only errors observable at
component boundaries are propagated at a high abstraction level, without loss of accuracy. This allows
to retain the advantages of structural modeling at much higher simulation speed.
Numerous approaches for the diﬀerent abstraction levels have been proposed, as for example: multi-
level simulation of switch-level and gate-level representations [9]; serial simulation of structural faults
in mixed-level gate-level/RTL models with event-based simulators [10, 11]; mixed-level fault-simulation
of gate-level and RTL using concurrent simulation [12, 13]; simulation of structural faults in mixed-
level gate-level/architectural-level simulations with symbolic simulation in the architecture-level model
[14, 15]; serial fault injections performed at RT-level with error propagation at system-level [5]; injection
of structural faults into mixed gate-level/high-level SystemC models [16]; and mutator-based injection of
faults into RTL and transaction-level models [17].
The work presented here is the first approach that eﬃciently implements concurrent multi-level fault
simulation across gate- and transaction-level in an integrated simulation environment. Our work is based
on a structural fault model with an eﬃcient concurrent fault simulator at gate-level. The eﬀects of faults
observable at gate-level boundaries are propagated concurrently at transaction-level, allowing to evaluate
realistic faults at system-level. The used rollback mechanism is simple to use with existing models and
transaction-level simulators.
The advantage of this approach is the combination of the precision of gate-level simulation with the high
simulation speed of transaction-level models (TLM, [18]). This allows to analyze the eﬀect of complex
applications on system reliability. TLMs for design exploration are reused here for reliability evaluation.
The presented methodology can be used for exploration early in the design flow since only gate-level
models of individual cores or components are required. This is often the case in core-based design flows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes shortly the modeling at
transaction-level. Section 3 presents the proposed methodology and the integration of the gate-level
sequential fault simulator within TLMs. Section 4 discusses the concurrent transaction-level fault prop-
agation approach and its implementation. Finally, section 5 presents two case studies and discusses the
consequences of a system-level reliability evaluation with the presented method.
2 Transaction-Level Modeling
Increased system complexity requires the move to higher levels of abstraction in system modeling [19].
Transaction-level models (TLMs) are used to facilitate simulation-driven design space exploration and
design verification [18] of large hardware/software systems with simulation speed-ups of multiple orders
of magnitude over gate- and RTL modeling.
The speed-up is achieved by abstracting from signal-level communication to complex communication
operations as atomic transactions. This reduces the number of events to be processed in event-driven
simulators and the number of context switches between simulation processes [20]. The modularity and
separation of communication and functionality in TLMs allow to quickly explore diﬀerent implementation
alternatives as is required in design exploration. Still, they provide enough detail to make important
design decisions regarding performance, die area and power [21, 22].
In the TLM notion, functional units are modeled as modules with a set of concurrent processes that
represent their behavior. These modules communicate by sending transactions through abstract commu-
nication channels with well-defined interfaces. The SystemC language and the TLM-2.0 standard [23]
provide the simulation kernel, common data types and interfaces required for transaction-level modeling
of bus-based System on Chip (SoC) platforms. Among others, the specified core interfaces comprise block-
ing and non-blocking transport interfaces which are used to send transactions between communication
initiators, interconnect resources and targets.
Transaction-level modeling, e.g. with SystemC, allows to model timing behavior with diﬀerent gran-
ularities, from cycle-accurate over approximately timed to untimed models [24]. The TLM-2.0 standard
2focuses on approximately timed models and distinguishes loosely and approximately timed models.
As TLMs of hardware and software modules are often used in design space exploration, they can be
reused for fault simulation.
3 Multi-level System Model for Fault Simulation
The multi-level fault simulation method proposed in this work combines the accuracy of gate-level fault
simulation and the simulation speed of behavioral models. A transaction-level model of the system is
augmented by precise gate-level models of components which are subject to fault injection.
Figure 1(a) depicts the principle of the proposed approach. The system and the target application
are modeled at transaction-level. For the hardware blocks and cores to be investigated, gate-level fault
simulator instances are created using gate-level models. The system is simulated at transaction-level
until a transaction with the component subject to fault simulation is requested. Upon the request,
fault simulation proceeds at gate-level. If a fault causes an observable error, this error is lifted to the
transaction-level. For each lifted fault, functional error propagation is performed at transaction-level.
The result of the error propagation is then evaluated at system-level and it is determined whether the
fault eventually results in a system failure.
A wrapper is used to fill the abstraction gap between the gate- and transaction-level (cf. figure 1(b)).
The wrapper encapsulates the gate-level model and translates transactions into the pin- and cycle-accurate
protocol of the gate-level component. It also includes the gate-level fault simulator, and lifts faults from
the gate-level to the transaction-level.
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Figure 1: Conceptual overview of the proposed multi-level fault simulation
The next section defines the terminology used here, followed by the description of the modeling at
transaction-level. Finally, the wrappers that translate transactions between the diﬀerent abstraction
levels, including the gate-level fault simulator, are detailed.
3.1 Terminology
A fault is an abstraction of one or more physical defects aﬀecting a circuit. A fault model is the formal
abstraction of a class of defects. Fault models are essential to the tractability and automation of design
for testability and design for reliability. An error is the consequence of a fault that has manifested in the
circuit state captured in the memory elements. A failure is the inability of the system to accomplish its
target mission when subject to a fault.
Fault simulation of a gate-level model determines which faults cause errors at the outputs of that
model. Fault lifting is the mapping of gate-level errors due to structural faults to a transaction-level fault
model. A mutation is an instrumentation for fault injection that becomes part of a (high-level) model
3and modifies its behavior according to a fault model [17]. Mutation-based testing is a common approach
in functional verification of high-level hardware-software systems. In the approach presented here, the
mutation is chosen to map well to structural faults and not to design bugs. The instrumentation is part
of the gate-level wrapper.
To classify the system level failure modes, the classification from [25] is used: Benign errors do not lead
to system failure, recoverable errors do not fail but may impact the performance, silent data corruption
(SDC) is the most severe failure mode, detected unrecoverable errors (DUE) allow the system to reach a
safe state upon failure.
3.2 Fault Lifting to the TLM
For fault simulation with high accuracy, the mapping, binding and timing of the TLM must be taken
into account. Mapping is the process of selecting an actual implementation for the functional system
model and determines what hardware components are required to implement the system functionality.
Binding involves scheduling the steps required to provide the system functionality and assigning them to
the hardware components selected during mapping. Since TLMs are often used for design exploration, it
is obvious that in early design steps not all of the components of the system may be mapped. However,
error masking often does exist even in the function provided by the system itself or in the application
running on the system. This inherent masking of operations in a data-flow graph is called transparency
[26]. The method presented here takes full advantage of the transparency in the behavior.
In the proposed multi-level approach, only the component subject to fault injection is required to have
a model at gate-level. Hence only a partial mapping of the entire system is required and binding may
be limited to the components subject to fault injection. As a result, the approach can be used early to
evaluate mapping and binding decisions and explore design alternatives w.r.t. reliability.
The timing accuracy of the transaction-level model can range across several orders of magnitude and
the designer has great freedom in modeling the timing aspects. On the other hand, RT- and gate-level
models are usually at least cycle accurate. Obviously, there may be structural faults that can impact
the temporal behavior of a sequential component and for example lead to longer completion times of
certain operations. System failures due to such faults may be masked in a loosely timed TLM. In order
to increase accuracy for this type of failure, adaptive timing accuracy [27] is used at least in the direct
surrounding of the component subject to fault injection.
The lifting of the gate-level errors to the TLM used in this work uses the fault model for TLM [17].
Instead of random mutations, it accurately reflects the eﬀects of structural faults on transactions issued
to and from the the component subject to fault injection. The following mutations are used: Corruption
of a parameter such as address, payload, transaction state or delay, transactions falsely issued by the
fault-simulated component.
For this purpose, there must be a correspondence between the errors at gate-level and a mutation in
the behavioral model. A structural fault within a gate-level module can be observable at the module’s
outputs. These errors can be classified into errors aﬀecting data, address or control outputs of the
gate-level module. Fig. 2 depicts how these gate-level error classes relate to the mutations of the TLM.
For the fault lifting in Fig. 2, we have taken advantage of the standard TLM 2.0 payload packet (i.e.
TLM_GENERIC_PAYLOAD) to find this correspondence. An error at the gate-level can aﬀect one of
these parameters at TLM level. As an example, an error in the “read request” signal for the memory at
gate-level model can result in the corruption of the TLM_READ_COMMAND attribute of a transaction
being issued. On the other hand, a fault in the data-path that results in an erroneous data output may
aﬀect the m_data parameter of the TLM payload.
In order to deal with faults that eﬀect the time behavior (e.g. transaction delay), the TLM model must
be timing aware. Diﬀerences in transaction duration caused by faults can impact system performance or
cause timeouts to be triggered. For blocking TLM calls with b_transport the transaction delay is passed
along with the transaction. Errors on the control lines that aﬀect the delay are translated to the TLM de-
lay parameter. Timeouts are reported to the originator through the TLM_INCOMPLETE_RESPONSE.
4M_command
M_address
M_data
M_length
M_response_status
M_byte_enable
M_byte_enable_length
M_streaming_width
TLM_READ_COMMAND
TLM_WRITE_COMMAND
TLM_IGNORE_COMMAND
TLM_OK_RESP
TLM_INCOMPLETE_RESP
TLM_GENERIC_ERROR_RESP
TLM_ADDRESS_ERROR_RESP
TLM_COMMAND_ERROR_RESP
TLM_BURST_ERROR_RESP
TLM_BYTE_ENABLE_ERROR_RESP
Control
Address
Data
Standard TLM Generic Payload ParametersGate Level Signals
Figure 2: Gate-Level to TLM Fault Lifting
For non-blocking calls with nb_transport, the actual simulator time is advanced before the response is
communicated.
3.3 Wrapper for Gate-Level Models
The precision of gate-level models allows to model multiple aspects of a system that are usually not
considered at transaction-level, as for example multi-valued logic, multiple clock phases and reset signals.
In a fault-free system, multi-valued logic is easily translated (e.g. for a well-behaved bus). Multiple
clock phases are deterministic if their relationship is known. And reset signals will flush any unknown
values from the gate-level model. In a gate-level component that is subject to structural fault injection,
these modeling aspects may be visible at the component boundary: Some faults aﬀect buses and cause
conflicts that should be considered at transaction-level. Multiple clock phases that were previously in a
known relationship become undetermined and lead to race conditions. And reset signals, due to their
high fan-out, have structural faults that result in any combination of uninitialized latches or flip-flops
that show up as unknowns at the gate-level/TLM boundary.
The wrapper that encapsulates the gate-level model and fault simulator is therefore responsible for both
the protocol translation between transaction- and gate-level, as well as the aforementioned fault lifting.
The accurate protocol translation from transactions to the pin and cycle accurate protocol of the gate-
level model is achieved by decomposing each transaction, mapping complex values to binary values, and
providing additional control signals at gate-level which are not explicitly represented at transaction-level
(e.g. reset or write-enable signals). The cycle and pin accurate values are processed by the synchronous
fault simulation of the gate-level model, where in each simulation cycle a new data vector is passed to
the simulator. The result of the simulation of each cycle is evaluated. If errors become observable at the
gate-level model boundary, propagation is conducted at transaction-level as detailed in section 4, using
a transaction derived from the result of the fault simulation.
Faults can lead to transaction properties that are not part of the fault-free specification of the commu-
nication protocol. For example, faults can cause transaction types such as burst transfers that are not
part of the fault-free communication. Hence, the wrapper must model more communication aspects for
the fault simulation case than for the fault-free case.
Since unknown values cannot easily be represented in a regular TLM, the wrapper replaces them by
random values or by values for the worst or best case, depending on whether a pessimistic or optimistic
bound of system reliability is to be evaluated. The exact strategy depends on the function of the given
component. Low-level simulators introduce a third fault class besides detected and undetected called pos-
sibly detected. Hence, a similar probabilistic consideration of unknowns must be done in the wrapper. In
5case of the worst case analysis, if unknown values appear at the gate-level boundary, they are propagated
at the transaction-level several times: by replacing them with zeroes, ones, random values, and values
that are the inverse of the good value simulation. If any propagation results in failure of the application,
the fault that resulted in the unknowns is classified as possibly detected.
A special consideration in the fault simulation wrapper is timing deviation and uncertainty as outlined
in the previous subsection. The wrapper must keep track of the fault simulation time, at which errors oc-
cur. To detect faults that cause the gate-level module to exceed the response time of the good simulation,
the wrapper must advance the fault simulator time beyond the simulator time of the good simulation.
The upper bound for this is the timeout specified by the bus model. Again, the fault simulation wrapper
must model details that go beyond the specification of the wrapped model and model the allowed spec-
ification of the communication mechanism and its correspondence to errors. For example, transaction
ordering errors can occur subject to faults even if the good-simulation assumes some specific ordering.
Furthermore, since faults can lead to unknowns on control signals, the exact duration of a transaction
can even become undetermined.
During the gate-level fault simulation a large degree of parallelism can be exploited by eﬃcient evalu-
ation of faults, patterns and gates in parallel [28]. Here, the concurrent fault simulation algorithm [29]
is used to achieve high eﬃciency by simulating several faults in parallel such that gains are obtained by
common sensitization criteria amongst faults.
4 Optimizations at the Abstraction Boundaries and in the TLM
The gate-level fault simulator determines the observability of fault eﬀects at the primary outputs of the
gate-level model. The gate-level fault simulator can take full advantage of a plethora of techniques that
significantly improve the computational eﬃciency such as concurrent simulation of faults, special data
structures and algorithmic optimizations [30]. To determine if a fault has any undesirable impact on
system functionality, its eﬀect (error) is propagated in the system and evaluated within the applica-
tion context. This section introduces an eﬃcient, parallel error propagation and evaluation method at
transaction-level.
4.1 Error injection mechanism
An error that is observable at the boundary between gate- and transaction-level is injected in an atomic
transaction and further propagated and evaluated in transaction-level simulation. The specific mutation
of a transaction is determined by the wrapper of the gate-level model whenever the gate-level simulator
requests fault propagation. To this end, an existing wrapper from functional validation (testbench) is
reused and extended with means to determine mutations based on information provided by the gate-level
fault simulator.
In order to keep the simulation eﬀort low and classify faults quickly, initially just a subset of outputs
at gate-level is evaluated to determine the type of mutation. For instance, if at a given time an output
specifying data validity of the corresponding port is deasserted in both the fault-free and faulty machines,
the data provided by the port does not need to be verified and no fault propagation at transaction-level
follows. Fault propagation is also given up if the error is certain to be masked by the bus protocol. For
example, error propagation is not requested if a fault aﬀects only bus address bits that are masked out
by the bus masking bits. Such faults are classified as benign already in the wrapper to avoid superfluous
error propagations.
4.2 Evaluation of system failure conditions
The functionality of a system is checked against its specification in functional verification. A system failure
is defined as a deviation of the system operation from its specification. The expected behavior included in
test scenarios from functional verification is reused in our fault simulation approach to construct gate-level
6wrappers and to evaluate overall system behavior. In a holistic model including also the environment
(e.g. a stability controller within a vehicle), certain system properties can be verified under faults.
If the component subject to fault simulation is self-testing or self-checking [31], this mechanism is used
for error detection and fault classification by checking the output for non-codewords. Such errors are
communicated with an appropriate transaction response and lead to an early abort of error propagation.
Similarly, assertions from functional verification, which usually compose built-in model instrumentation,
are also reused. Assertions implement sanity checks to find faulty states and control flow violations. At
system-level they check for instance out-of-bounds exceptions.
To speed up fault simulation, the transaction-level fault propagation is halted as soon as there is enough
information for fault classification. In case of signal processing applications, a checksum is calculated from
the output data stream. The checksum is then evaluated and compared at intermediate checkpoints.
Assertions used for functional verification are reused to detect invalid behavior earlier than the checksum
mechanism.
4.3 Concurrent error propagation
In order to eﬃciently propagate a large number of errors it is important to have an eﬀective means of
reverting to the good machine state and undoing the changes made by the propagation. In gate-level
fault simulators, this is achieved by keeping track of the changes on a stack or by using tags or group
IDs to identify data that diﬀers from the good machine state. However, this is not feasible in TLM
simulation since the models consist mostly of functional abstractions in the form of host-compiled code.
Besides code modification, existing error injection approaches for TLM work with instrumentation of
the compiled simulation binary [32] or directly with the TLM simulation kernel [33]. But with all these
methods, one simulator session can only be used for a single injection.
The error injection method proposed here is based on the concept of concurrent fault simulation
with one fault-free machine and several faulty machines evaluated in parallel. The fault-free machine is
running as the main process. Faulty machines are created quickly as sub-processes using operating system
facilities. Since processes are protected from each other, the cost of a rollback amounts to terminating
the child process that executes the faulty machine. Besides its low cost the approach is by principle also
truly concurrent on host computers with multiple cores.
The approach is easily implemented on top of any existing transaction-level model. No changes to the
simulation kernel are necessary and intellectual property can be used as is. The evaluation of system
failure or success can be done entirely in the faulty machine. Only for the fault classification mentioned
before, communication between the good and faulty machine processes must be established. However,
the classification is easily enumerated and it can be communicated cheaply using the process return value
upon termination of the faulty machine process.
4.4 Implementation
The multi-level fault simulation algorithm has been implemented based on the sequential gate-level fault
simulator Hope [30] and the OSCI SystemC 2.2 and TLM-2.0 libraries. To allow for the integration into
the object oriented SystemC simulation environment, a C++ wrapper is implemented for the Hope fault
simulator. In the Hope wrapper, relevant data structures and methods were exposed to obtain fault
detection information and methods were added to initiate error propagation for faults visible at the gate-
level boundary. Separate instances of the Hope fault simulator are dynamically created for the considered
gate-level models. While the algorithmic optimizations in Hope target the stuck-at fault model, they can
be extended to other structural fault models using the concept of conditional stuck-at faults [34].
Figure 3 shows the interaction between the core wrapper, the Hope fault simulator instance and the
faulty machine at transaction-level. The gate-level fault simulator is part of the good machine and faulty
TLM machines are created as necessary using the POSIX fork() command. This allows to quickly create
a faulty machine since Unix implements process forks with copy on write. Consequently, fault-free and
faulty machine share the same memory regions until a memory page is modified in the faulty machine.
7Overall, the mechanism is transparent for many system models, but some care must be taken for file
handles opened for writing in the simulation environment and the file handles should be closed in faulty
machines.
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5 Evaluation
The evaluation of the proposed multi-level fault simulation method concentrates on the fault classification
accuracy and performance. We target the higher bound of fault detectability, and thus follow the approach
of multiple propagation for unknown values (cf. section 3.3). We perform experiments on three classes
of applications executed on an AMBA based SoC with a LEON3 processor. The SoC contains hardware
accelerator cores for Triple-DES (Data Encryption Standard), AES (Advanced Encryption Standard),
as well as for two-dimensional discrete cosine transformation (2D-DCT) (cf. fig. 4). The AES core is
equipped with built-in self-test (BIST) facilities.
Except for the validation, the experiments were run on a multiprocessor system with 8 Intel Xeon
CPUs (2.8 GHz). The memory usage did not exceed 250 MB in any of the experiments.
AHB 
ControllerCPU (Leon3)
Memory 
Controller
SRAMROM 3DES 2D-DCT
AHB-APB 
Bridge
AMBA AHB
AMBA APB
AES
BIST
Figure 4: SoC with Triple-DES, AES and DCT accelerators
5.1 Validation
The proposed approach is validated in a traditional fault injection environment based on a state-of-the-
art commercial simulator. The SoC is modeled at RT-level, except for the core subject to fault injection
which is modeled at gate-level.
In each simulation run a single stuck-at fault is evaluated. The simulation is run until a result of the
application is produced. A time-out is set in order to detect faults that lead to deadlocks and unacceptable
delays. The simulation outcome is evaluated by the fault injection environment and the fault is classified
8accordingly. Due to the high computational cost, a random sample of 3000 faults per core is investigated
this way, so that the per-application validation eﬀort does not exceed two weeks.
Each fault is classified according to the categories from section 4.2. In validation experiments the
following cases are discerned: (i) covered—the classification from the proposed method agrees with the
validation experiment; (ii) false corrupt—the fault causes a silent data corruption (SDC) in the proposed
method, but is benign or causes a detected and unrecoverable error (DUE) in the validation experiment;
(iii) false benign—the fault is benign in the proposed method, but causes an SDC or DUE in the validation
experiment; (iv) false detected—the fault results in an DUE in the proposed method, but is benign or
causes an SDC in the validation experiment.
Validation experiments of the proposed method and the reference simulator were conducted on a farm
of workstations equipped with AMD Athlon 64 Dual Core Processors (2.4 GHz) and 4 GB of RAM.
5.2 Triple-DES Encryption Application
The first case study is based on an encryption application utilizing the Triple-DES core in the SoC from
figure 4. It encrypts a string of 64-bit words using a 64-bit key. The software part of the application is
responsible of the block-wise transfer of data to the core and the read-back of results. This application
is chosen as an example that exhibits almost no inherent masking.
The Triple-DES dedicated core has been obtained from OpenCores1 and synthesized for the LSI10k
generic library. It contains 19,917 logic cells and 53,010 stuck-at faults. In the following, we present the
results for the system-level eﬀects of faults in the Triple-DES core obtained by the proposed multi-level
approach, and then we discuss its performance and accuracy.
Table 1 presents system-level fault masking in four scenarios. The first column specifies the type and
length of the input data set that is encrypted. The encryption keys were chosen randomly for each
scenario. In the second column, we give the number of sensitized faults, i.e., faults that produce an
observable change on the core boundaries but do not necessarily lead to errors at system-level. The third
and fourth column provide the number of SDCs and benign errors, respectively. As there is no error
detection mechanism, detected and unrecoverable errors do not occur (cf. section 4.2). In all scenarios
more than 99% of faults that were sensitized, led to an error on the system-level (SDC). This is explained
by the fact that the results from the core are directly transferred to the system output, so no data error
masking takes place. The remaining 193 faults cause errors only during inactivity of the “data ready”
signal and hence they are benign.
Scenario
Faults Silent data Benign Num. sim. Gate-level TLM+Sys Overall
sensitized corruptions errors contexts Hope CPU-time CPU-time run-time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
English 3.5 KB 32916 32723 193 37983 1m 16s 4m 18s 5m 34s
Italian 21 KB 33247 33054 193 37396 5m 56s 5m 10s 11m 6s
Latin 20 KB 32901 32708 193 37809 5m 41s 5m 20s 11m 1s
Random 8 KB 32953 32760 193 37777 2m 21s 4m 23s 6m 44s
Table 1: Fault masking and run-time results for Triple-DES application
The last four columns of table 1 give an insight into the performance of our approach on the 8-core
machine. Column “Num. sim. contexts” gives the number of fault propagations performed using fork.
The sixth and seventh column provide the CPU-time spent for the concurrent fault simulator and for
the execution of the TLM model, respectively. The time needed for the child process creation and
termination is included in the latter. The last column provides the overall run-time of our approach. The
Hope CPU-time proved to be one fifth to one half of the total execution time.
The validation was performed on a random sample of 3000 faults from the full set of 53,010 faults. A
string of 3,576 ASCII characters was encoded using various keys. According to the classification from
section 5.1, all the sampled faults were categorized as “covered” by the proposed multi-level method, i.e.,
1http://www.opencores.org
9no fault was mispredicted. The run-times are summarized in table 2. The first column lists the type of
the key used for encryption, and the subsequent columns provide the comparison between the CPU time
of the validation experiments (RTL/gate) and the proposed approach (TLM/Hope), both performed on
the same Athlon machine. We achieved a perfect match under an average speed-up of about 13,200x.
Scenario
CPU-time CPU-time
RTL/gate TLM/Hope
All “0” 233h 67.1s
All “1” 243h 88.6s
Sequence 234h 51.4s
Random 242h 53.0s
Table 2: Validation results for Triple-DES application (random sample of 3,000 faults)
5.3 AES Encryption Application
The second case study is based on the self-testable AES core within the SoC from figure 4. The core
is able to encrypt a string of 64-bit words using a 64-bit key. Its BIST functionality provides a 64-bit
signature that is unique for the core—any deviation in the signature indicates that the core is faulty.
The software part of the application is responsible of the block-wise transfer of data to the core and the
read-back of results. Similarly to the Triple-DES application, AES exhibits little inherent masking.
The self-testable AES core has been obtained from the authors of [35]. It has been synthesized for
LSI10k library and contains 22,985 logic cells and 53,850 stuck-at faults.
Table 3 presents system-level fault masking and is analogous to table 1. The first four applications are
equivalent to those discussed in the previous case study. The following four applications are similar to
the first four, except that they begin with a BIST run. If a fault is detected by the BIST, it is classified
as DUE. If a fault was not classified as a DUE and results in failure of the application, it is considered
as SDC. If a fault is not detected by BIST and does not influence the application, the fault is benign.
In each scenario more than 96% of faults that were sensitized, were either detected by BIST (DUE) or
resulted in SDC. BIST was proven to detect 95% faults from the full set of 53,850 stuck-ats. It failed
to detect at least 1411 faults (2.6%) that led to a failure in the sixth application. The undetected faults
were found to reside either at the primary inputs or at the gates in the direct neighborhood thereof. As
the BIST runs with a constant seed that is applied internally, the faults at data and key inputs do not
propagate and thus are not detected.
Scenario
Faults Silent data Detected Benign Num. sim. Gate-level TLM+Sys Overall
sensitized corruptions unrec. error errors contexts Hope CPU-time CPU-time run-time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
English 3.5 KB 45836 44274 - 1562 45670 24s 1m 59s 2m 23s
Italian 21 KB 46213 44601 - 1612 45676 48s 2m 7s 2m 55s
Latin 20 KB 46057 44478 - 1579 45646 47s 2m 8s 2m 55s
Random 8 KB 46071 44487 - 1584 45562 31s 2m 0s 2m 31s
BIST, Eng. 3.5 KB 52973 1334 51146 493 54639 10m 12s 10m 3s 20m 15s
BIST, Ita. 21 KB 53076 1411 51146 519 54716 10m 18s 9m 4s 19m 22s
BIST, Lat. 20 KB 52986 1328 51146 512 54633 10m 13s 8m 30s 18m 43s
BIST, Rnd. 8 KB 53053 1398 51146 509 54703 10m 13s 8m 40s 18m 53s
Table 3: Fault masking and run-time results for AES application
The last four columns of table 3 provide performance details for the previously discussed scenarios.
As a single BIST-run takes 512 cycles and faults can be dropped only after the run is complete, the last
four scenarios require a considerable eﬀort at the low-level, which approaches half of the overall run-time.
However, as a BIST run results in massive fault dropping, the overall run-time is little aﬀected by the
length of the application itself. For this reason, even though the applications diﬀer in the length of the
text subject to encryption, they exhibit similar run-times.
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Like in the previous case study, validation is performed by encoding a string of 3,576 ASCII characters
with various keys. A random sample of 3000 faults was chosen from the full set of 53,850 faults. For
all the sampled faults our approach provided the correct classification and all faults were categorized as
“covered” w.r.t. section 5.1 . The execution times for the validation experiments are summarized in table
4, which is analogous to the previously discussed table 2. We achieved a perfect match under an average
speed-up of about 6,400x.
Scenario
CPU-time CPU-time
RTL/gate TLM/Hope
All “0” 278h 21.9s
All “1” 281h 22.2s
Sequence 288h 22.1s
Random 278h 22.2s
BIST, All “0” 298h 4m 59s
BIST, All “1” 306h 4m 58s
BIST, Sequence 290h 5m 6s
BIST, Random 295h 5m 9s
Table 4: Validation results for AES application (random sample of 3,000 faults)
5.4 JPEG Encoder Application
In case of the JPEG encoding application we study the strong impact of error masking. The baseline JPEG
encoding algorithm can be decomposed into four steps: (1) color transformation, (2) two-dimensional
discrete cosine transform (2D-DCT), (3) quantization, and (4) lossless compression. It is performed by
the SoC architecture from fig. 4. As the 2D-DCT is the most computationally expensive operation, it
is accelerated by the hardware core. All other operations are performed by the LEON3 processor. The
2D-DCT core has been obtained from OpenCores and synthesized for the LSI10K library. It contains
28,001 logic cells and 78,914 stuck-at faults. In the following, we study the performance and accuracy of
our approach for several case studies with various images.
Table 5 describes the eﬀects of faults in the 2D-DCT core. The first column specifies the type and
pixel dimensions of the image that is encoded in each scenario. Subsequent columns are analogous to the
previously discussed table 1. Compared to the Triple-DES and AES applications, there is a much larger
proportion of sensitized faults that lead to benign errors, i.e., faults that are masked by the application
although their eﬀect is observable on the core boundaries. Among the sensitized faults, from 16% up to
36% of faults are benign. This is due to the error masking property of the quantization step.
Scenario
Faults Silent data Benign Num. Sim. Gate-level TLM Overall
sensitized corruptions errors contexts Hope CPU-time CPU-time run-time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
White 8x8 25297 16295 9002 25927 56s 1m 15s 2m 11s
Black 8x8 22729 14420 8309 25399 57s 1m 16s 2m 13s
Noise 8x8 48794 34064 14730 47892 1m 14s 3m 48s 5m 02s
Fruits 64x48 64797 54141 10656 279563 9m 11s 21m 5s 30m 15s
Table 5: Fault masking and run-time results for JPEG application
The run-time results for our approach running on the previously mentioned 8 core machine are gathered
in the last four columns of table 5. The number of simulation contexts clearly depends on the image size,
as for each 8x8 pixel block the eﬀects of all sensitized faults that were not yet classified as SDC have to
be analyzed. Due to the masking property of JPEG, a large number of error propagation occurs before
the associated fault is classified as SDC and can be dropped. Due to the fault dropping, the run-time is
not linear with the image size. For the image composed of 48 pixel blocks, the run-time increases just 7
times compared to the scenario with a single block.
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The validation experiments were conducted in a setting identical to the one used for Triple-DES. Due
to high computational eﬀort, validation was run for scenarios with a single 8x8 pixel image. The results
are summarized in table 6. It is analogous to table 2 except for the two additional columns that give
the number of “benign faults” and the number of faults categorized as “false corrupt” (cf. section 5.1)
among the 3,000 faults in the sample. From 52% up to 82% of sampled faults were found benign, what is
attributed to the error masking property of the JPEG quantization step. The eﬀects of 2 to 7 faults per
scenario were mispredicted and classified as “false corrupt”, which is pessimistic. They were found to either
result in a period of an unknown value on the “data ready” signal while the signal should be inactive,
or generate additional active pulses on this signal after the data becomes invalid. In the validation
experiments, these faults were classified as benign only due to the short length of the application and
favorable synchronization. Under unfavorable circumstances they could in fact cause SDCs. However,
even if we assume the validation experiments to be the golden reference, we achieve a match for 99.8%
of faults under an average speed-up of 12,700x.
Scenario
Faults False CPU-time CPU-time
benign corrupt RTL/gate TLM/Hope
White 8x8 2377 6 115h 29.9s
Black 8x8 2463 7 117h 31.3s
Sequence 8x8 2067 2 119h 36.9s
Noise 8x8 1580 2 148h 42.8s
Table 6: Validation results for JPEG application (random sample of 3,000 faults)
6 Conclusions
The presented fault simulation methodology allows to consider structural faults in a multi-level simulation
at gate-level and transaction-level. Simulation time is improved by four orders of magnitude by using
an eﬃcient concurrent fault simulator at gate-level and concurrent error propagation at transaction-
level. The methodology and error propagation mechanism allow to reuse TLM models from design space
exploration. The accuracy of precise gate-level simulations is achieved.
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